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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
EFFECT OF DISCHARGE
What was described as a seeming conflict between two Louisiana
statutes arose in Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Burdette.' The creditor
obtained a money judgment against the debtor in September, 1963.
The judgment, duly recorded in East Baton Rouge Parish, was a
judicial mortgage on real property the debtor had acquired subject
to a purchase-money mortgage in 1956. Subsequently the debtor be-
came bankrupt and listed the judgment in his schedule of debts. He
obtained a discharge in bankruptcy on September 15, 1964. Within
the ten years allowed by statute,' the creditor brought an action to
revive3 the money judgment, to which the debtor pleaded his dis-
charge in bankruptcy as an affirmative defense.4 On the basis of this
plea the trial court dismissed the action. The First Circuit Court of
Appeal reversed.
When a judgment creditor brings a revival action: "A judgment
shall be rendered in such a proceeding reviving the original judgment,
unless the defendant shows good cause why it should not be revived." 5
Since 1970, a judgment debtor who has been discharged in bank-
ruptcy, may, upon a rule to show cause against the clerk of court and
ex officio recorder of mortgages, obtain "the cancellation of the in-
scription of any dischargeable judgment rendered twelve months
previously unless the judgment creditor can prove that he continues
to possess a secured interest in the property affected by such judg-
ment . .. ."'
As the present action was one to revive a judgment, the burden
was on the defendant to show good cause why it should not be re-
vived. He did not show good cause by merely pleading the discharge
in bankruptcy for the reason that a valid judgment lien, or judicial
mortgage, on the property not administered in bankruptcy is unaf-
fected by the discharge.7 To prevent revival of the judgment the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 295 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3547.
3. See LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2031, which provides a method of reviving money
judgments.
4. Id. art. 1005.
5. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2031.
6. LA. R.S. 9:5166 (Supp. 1970). For a discussion of the statute, see The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term - Bankruptcy, 33 LA. L. REV.
269, 270 (1973).
7. 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.29 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
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debtor should have proved, if he could, that the creditor had no
secured interest in the property because of the prior conventional
mortgage.
Kohnke v. Justice,8 by contrast, was an action by a discharged
judgment debtor to cancel the inscription of a dischargeable judg-
ment. Accordingly, the burden was on the creditor to prove that he
continued to possess a secured interest in the property. This meant,
in the words of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, "that the judg-
ment creditor must prove that the property affected by his judgment
is worth in dollar value an amount sufficiently in excess of existing
encumbrances which prime his judgment as to afford him a secured
interest in the property affected by his judgment."I No such proof was
made, and the court of appeal, reversing the district court, ordered
that the judgment be cancelled.
Hardy v. Kidder" had it origin in a traffic accident. Shortly after
commencement of plaintiff's action for damages in 1969, defendant
became bankrupt and in September 1969 he obtained a stay" of
plaintiff's action pending discharge, which was granted in August,
1970. On November 20, 1970, a preliminary default was taken in
plaintiff's action. On February 19, 1971, after evidence was presented
for plaintiff, the judgment was confirmed. Included in the evidence
was a letter from defendant's trustee in bankruptcy stating that de-
fendant had been discharged from his debts including the one in suit.
A notice of judgment was issued and was served on defendant on
February 24. The following day defendant's attorneys, alleging that
good grounds existed, moved for a new trial," which was denied by
the district court. The court of appeal affirmed' 3 and the supreme
court granted certiorari.'4
In its original disposition,' 5 with two dissents, the supreme court
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal. The unexplained failure
of defendant's counsel to answer and plead the discharge in bank-
ruptcy as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's action was not "good
ground" for granting a new trial and the trial court thus had commit-
ted no abuse of discretion. On rehearing, however, the supreme court
reversed,' 6 with three dissents, and remanded the case to the district
8. 280 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
9. Id. at 667.
10. 292 So. 2d 575 (La. 1974).
11. Pursuant to § 11a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29a (1970).
12. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1973.
13. 267 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
14. 263 La. 622, 268 So. 2d 678 (1972).
15. Hardy v. Kidder, 292 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1974).
16. Id. at 577.
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court for a new trial. The controlling opinion emphasized that the
articles of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be construed liberally, 7
and held that there was good ground for the grant of a new trial in
the interests of justice.
PROMISE TO PAY DISCHARGED DEBT
In Louisiana"8 and elsewhere a new promise to pay a debt dis-
charged in bankruptcy is actionable without new consideration; 9 and
giving a new note for a discharged debt amounts to such a promise."
If, however, the note is given not for payment of the discharged debt
but for some other consideration which fails, the failure of considera-
tion may be raised as a defense against anyone other than a holder
in due course.2' That was the situation in Republic Finance of Gra-
mercy, Inc. v. Davis,22 where the evidence showed that defendant
made the note not to acknowledge a pre-existing debt but to regain
possession of his furniture and appliances, relying on assurances by
the plaintiff which were not fulfilled. Though the trial court held that
defendant had failed to prove fraud and gave judgment on the note
for the plaintiff, the court of appeal treated the case as one of failure
of consideration, and reversed.
17. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 5051.
18. Irwin v. Hunnewell, 207 La. 422, 21 So. 2d 485 (1945).
19. COLLIER § 17.33.
20. Booty v. American Fin. Corp., 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
21. X-L Fin. Co. v. Gregoire, 217 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1968).
22. 289 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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